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Abstract
Can electoral institutions induce lasting changes in citizens’ voting habits? We
study the long-term and spillover effects of compulsory voting in the Swiss can-
ton of Vaud (1900–1970) and find that this intervention increases turnout in
federal referendums by 30 percentage points. However, despite its magnitude,
the effect returns to zero quickly after voting is no longer compulsory. We find
minor spillover effects on related forms of political participation that also vanish
immediately after compulsory voting has been abolished. Overall, these results
question habit formation arguments in the context of compulsory voting. They
are consistent with a more parsimonious theory in which individuals quickly ad-
apt to externally imposed changes in the costs of non-voting.
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Participation in elections is the most widespread form of civic engagement and a key mech-
anism through which citizens can hold elected officials accountable (Persson, Tabellini, and
Trebbi 2003; Besley 2005; Schaltegger and Torgler 2007). However, many countries have
experienced a long-term decline in political participation with turnout levels having reached
all time lows (Solijonov 2016). To alleviate widespread concerns about the lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy and the potential policy bias due to low turnout (Jackman 2001; Mueller
and Stratmannn 2003), a considerable number of countries have introduced compulsory vot-
ing.1 While the existing evidence clearly suggests that compulsory voting increases turnout
contemporaneously (Franklin 1999; Jackman 2001), we know surprisingly little about its
long-term and spillover effects: Do compulsory voting laws have a lasting impact on turnout
even after they have been abolished? Can compulsory voting increase citizens’ willingness
to engage in other types of political collective action for which participation has remained
voluntary?
We explore these questions by studying a citizenry that has been exposed to a sanctioned
compulsory voting law for over 20 years. Theories of habitual voting (Weber 1968; Almond
and Verba 1963; Lijphart 1997; Plutzer 2002; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003; Fowler 2006)
predict that citizens develop a voting habit under compulsory voting because they are more
likely to having repeatedly engaged in this activity. Consistent with this reasoning, recent
empirical work on the formation of voting habits documents that those who voted in today’s
election are also more likely to participate in subsequent elections (Meredith 2009; Fujiwara,
Meng, and Vogl 2016). This habit-formation argument not only predicts the contemporan-
eous effect of compulsory voting on turnout in elections. It also suggests that compulsory
voting has broader positive spillover effects on other types of political participation and has
a lasting, positive impact on the level of civic engagement in a political system even after it
has been abolished (Lijphart 1997; Cooter 2000; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012).
Our study offers a comprehensive analysis of the effects of compulsory voting by dis-
1According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, about 14% of all
countries practice compulsory voting (IDEA 2014).
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tinguishing between its contemporaneous, long-term, and spillover effects on several types
of political participation. We explore the impact of a sanctioned and long-standing, but
eventually abolished compulsory voting law in the Swiss canton Vaud that aimed at build-
ing civic virtue by increasing citizens’ participation in direct legislation (Matsusaka 1992).
Vaud practiced compulsory voting in federal referendums, i.e., direct legislation, from 1925
to 1948. Abstention triggered a sizable fine that local police authorities collected by visiting
nonvoters’ homes in person, thereby adding a social shaming component to the monetary
sanction imposed on non-voters.
Vaud exclusively sanctioned abstention in federal referendums, while other forms of polit-
ical collective action remained voluntary. We exploit this specific design of Vaud’s compuls-
ory voting norm to explore the existence of positive spillover effects of compulsory voting
for federal referendums on related forms of civic engagement that remained voluntary. Since
policymakers aimed to foster civic participation more generally, the temporal variation in
Vaud’s compulsory voting norm in combination with its specific design provides a rare op-
portunity to test norm internationalization and habit formation arguments. Due to the large
number of potential confounding factors that plague cross-country comparisons, an empirical
evaluation of these theories poses formidable methodological challenges. Our case study of
Vaud’s compulsory voting law promises to yield more credible causal estimates of the im-
mediate, long-term, and spillover effects of external sanctions on political participation than
cross-country analyses, where case heterogeneity complicates causal inference. Providing
such causal estimates instead of correlations is crucial because otherwise we cannot ascer-
tain whether any changes in political participation are due to compulsory voting or other
unobserved factors.
Using a synthetic control design (Abadie and Gardezabal 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller 2010) we find that the introduction of compulsory voting in Vaud massively
increased turnout in federal referendums, by about 30 percentage points on average, when
compared to a synthetic Vaud that did not introduce compulsory voting. The available cross-
country data suggest that turnout is about 12 percentage points higher in political systems
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that practice compulsory voting (Blais and Young 1996). The fact that our treatment effect
exceeds previous estimates by more than 100% strengthens the theoretical expectation that
at least parts of the citizenry became habitual voters through repeated participation in
referendums. Therefore, compulsory voting should have increased turnout even after it was
abolished and it should also have increased participation in other types of civic engagement.
Our results suggest that compulsory voting had no long-term impact on participation
in federal referendums. We document some contemporaneous, positive spillover effects on
closely related forms of civic engagement, for example, turnout in cantonal referendums and
federal elections, especially if these were concurrent with federal referendums. However,
the spillover effects vanished as soon as Vaud abolished compulsory voting. In addition,
we find that compulsory voting had no positive impact on citizens’ political activity as
measured by the number of signatures on petitions. Taken together, our results suggest that
although compulsory voting strongly affects contemporaneous levels of political participation
in ways consistent with rationalist models of turnout, its potential to induce changes in
citizens’ fundamental voting habits remains limited. This may reflect individuals’ reluctance
to internalize political participation norms that are externally imposed by political elites.
Compulsory Voting and Habit Formation
The idea of norm compliance as a consequence of internalization underlies prominent the-
ories of preference formation through socialization (Durkheim 1922; Weber 1968) and social
control (Ross 1896). As Weber (1968) points out, once a norm has been internalized, many
individuals tend to follow it routinely “as the result of unreflective habituation to a regularity
of life that has engraved itself as a custom” (p. 312). Previous work on the determinants
of electoral behavior and political attitudes argues that habit formation occurs early in life
(Franklin 2004; Healy and Malhotra 2013). Citizens are thought to develop a voting habit
during their first experiences with elections and voting. More specifically, Franklin (2004)
argues that a citizen’s propensity to vote reflects whether, as a first time voter, she has
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experienced a period of high turnout, i.e., a political culture that emphasizes the importance
of civic engagement.
Most empirical studies analyzing the sources of habitual voting have estimated local av-
erage treatment effects of an exogenous stimulus on the probability of turnout for a small set
of compliers (see Table A1 in the Appendix for an overview of existing studies). Fujiwara,
Meng, and Vogl (2016) estimate that a one point decrease in turnout induced by higher pre-
cipitation lowers turnout in subsequent U.S. presidential elections by 0.7 to 0.9 percentage
points. Analyzing individual-level data, Plutzer (2002) investigates how citizens transition
from habitual nonvoters to habitual voters and documents a considerable degree of stabil-
ity in political behavior over the life course that strongly correlates with an individual’s
parental political involvement. In line with the idea of voting as a habit-forming activity,
Gerber, Green, and Shachar’s (2003) field-experimental evidence suggests that get-out-the-
vote campaigns based on face-to-face canvassing and direct mailings increase voter turnout
in subsequent years. More recently, Meredith (2009) finds that voters who are barely 18 at
the time of a presidential election, and hence eligible to vote, are also about four percent
more likely to vote in the subsequent election than those who just missed the age cut-off.
The existing literature not only lends empirical credibility to the argument that political
participation can be habit-forming over time. It also directs our attention to exogenous
shocks in the costs of voting as an important explanation for the long-term dynamics of
turnout (Hodler, Luechinger, and Stutzer 2015). For example, the habitual voting argu-
ment suggests that extended periods of high turnout due to compulsory voting should affect
the long-term evolution of political participation through its habit-forming impact. Con-
sequently, we expect that, even after compulsory voting has been abolished, the turnout
levels we observe among individuals should exceed those one would expect if compulsory
voting had not been practiced.
So far, scholars have almost exclusively analyzed the effects of compulsory voting on
turnout in elections for which participation had been made compulsory. Yet long-standing
compulsory voting laws may also change higher-order preferences for political participation in
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other types of political collective action for which engagement remained voluntary. According
to Cooter (2000), long-term enforced compliance with a legal norm, e.g., adhering to speed
limits for cars sanctioned by speeding tickets, will induce individuals to internalize a norm
that prescribes more careful behavior in traffic more generally, e.g., when riding a bike
or walking. In the realm of political behavior, political participation may also have such
spillover effects. Increasing an individual’s participation in one type of political activity
could over time also cause an increase in engagement in other types of political collective
action (Almond and Verba 1963; Berelson and Steiner 1964).2 This argument predicts that
compulsory voting has positive spillover effects on other types of political collective action
even if these forms of civic engagement remain voluntary.
We empirically evaluate these theoretical predictions by studying how the introduction
and eventual abolishment of a long-standing sanctioned compulsory voting law in the Swiss
canton of Vaud affected participation in various types of political collective action.
Compulsory Voting in Switzerland
To understand the variation in compulsory voting laws that we exploit to estimate the effects
of compulsory voting on turnout, we have to briefly outline the Swiss political system.
Its federal structure dates back to the 1803 Act of Mediation, which marks the end of a
longstanding conflict between Unitarists and Federalists (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). The Act
of Mediation re-installed the 13 old cantons and created six new ones.3 After the Congress
of Vienna, another six jurisdictions joined the Federation as cantons. Figure A1 in the
Appendix shows a map of the Swiss cantons in the early 20th century. The Act of Mediation
also empowered cantons to pass suffrage legislation determining which individuals had the
right to vote (Jorio and Sonderegger 2007). Cantons generally disenfranchised female citizens
2Peterson (1992) reviews a large number of observational studies that report a positive correlation
between participation in the workplace and civic engagement (Lijphart 1997).
3The new cantons were former tributary regions of the union Alte Eidgenossenschaft.
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and male individuals that did not meet certain economic, age, or religious requirements.4
During the regeneration (1830-1848), Swiss cantons decided to extend the suffrage to all
solvent Swiss adults. The 1848 Swiss constitution granted all male citizens the right to vote,
but still provided cantons with some freedom to decide on the exact design of the electoral
system (Tobler 1945). Some cantons introduced compulsory voting. Compulsory voting
typically varied in domain (communal, cantonal, federal) and severity of the associated
monetary sanctions for non-voting (see Table A5 in the appendix). Vaud’s compulsory
voting law stands out and lends itself particularly well to examine internalization and habit
formation in the context of forced behavior because of three reasons. First, Vaud practiced
compulsory voting for more than two decades and rigorously enforced a substantial monetary
sanction, which leads us to expect that habit formation and participation spillovers should
have been most likely to occur. Second, voting was compulsory only for federal referendums
but remained voluntary for other types of political participation. We exploit this rare feature
to empirically explore political participation spillovers on other forms of political collective
action, e.g., participation in federal elections or the signing of petitions, which remained
voluntary. Third, Vaud eventually abolished compulsory voting which presents a unique
opportunity to empirically assess whether this legal norm had any lasting effects on political
participation even after voting was no longer compulsory.
Vaud’s parliament passed the bill on political rights # 113/49 on 17th November 1924.
This electoral reform required all citizens between the age of 20 and 65 years to participate in
federal referendums (Table A4 reports the original text of the bill). Citizens that did not vote
in federal referendums had to pay a fine of two Swiss francs (Gazette de Lausanne 1924), an
amount which appears substantial given the canton’s income distribution. For an ordinary
worker, this monetary sanction equaled about 150% of his average hourly wage (Siegenthaler
and Ritzmann 1996, Table G.01).5 In addition, local police authorities collected the fine by
4Female suffrage on the federal level was only introduced in 1971.
5Plausibly, since the size of the fine was independent of an individual’s income, it placed a larger burden
on low-income citizens than on high earners (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016).
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visiting nonvoters’ homes in person, thereby adding a social shaming component that should
have amplified the contemporaneous impact of compulsory voting on political participation
(Funk 2010; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Knack 1992). Only individuals suffering from
an illness and those having to travel long distances to reach the polling places could submit
valid excuses within two days after the referendum. Each municipality’s prefect decided
about whether the excuse was valid. Citizens could not appeal this decision. In addition,
citizens older than 65 were exempt from compulsory voting. According to the historical data,
9 percent of the population was older than 60 years. The share of individuals older then
65 was presumably substantially smaller because for those born in 1900 the life expectancy
was still only 46 years. Arguably, the life expectancy for those born in the 1850s (this would
be the cohort turning 65 in the year in which compulsory voting was introduced), was even
lower, which means that the share of elderly in Vaud’s population exempt from compulsory
voting was minimal.6
Two key objectives motivated Vaud’s parliament to introduce compulsory voting. First,
policymakers intended to develop a more participatory political culture in Vaud that would
foster political collective action. Specifically, advocates of compulsory voting expected that
sanctioning nonvoting will “foster civic virtue in all classes of society” (Cantonal Chancellery
of Vaud 1924). Second, political elites wanted to increase Vaud’s national-level political
say in federal legislation through higher participation rates in federal referendums. Since
federal referendums require a double majority, i.e., a majority of the votes cast (Volksmehr)
and a majority in at least half of the cantons (Sta¨ndemehr), an increase in turnout in a
specific canton may indeed increase this region’s influence on federal referendums (Gazette
de Lausanne 1920).7
The revenues from the fine imposed on non-voters, which varied between 8’000 and
16’000 Swiss francs per referendum, helped financing a charity fund for poor people and
6See www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/06/blank/key/04/04.html, last accessed
on 13 May 2016.
7Kriesi and Trechsel (2008) provide an overview of direct-democratic institutions in Switzerland.
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public hospitals.8 Vaud temporarily suspended its compulsory voting law because of military
mobilization in the World War II period from 1940 to 1945 and reactivated it in late 1945
(Gazette de Lausanne 1945). The design of the compulsory voting law, for example the fine
and the way in which it was collected, remained unchanged. Although Vaud’s government
continued to generally support compulsory voting, it eventually abolished compulsory voting
in 1948 mainly because of its high administrative costs.
We will exploit this policy intervention to examine the contemporaneous effects of com-
pulsory voting on turnout in federal referendums, whether it generated political participation
spillovers on other forms of civic engagement, and whether it gave rise to a long-term increase
in turnout that lasted even after Vaud had abolished compulsory voting.
Data and Method
We collected data on canton-level turnout in the 166 federal referendums held from 1900
to 1970. We also collected a large set of covariates that previous work has shown to help
predict turnout including public spending and revenues, percentage of secondary students
(Mueller 2005, p. 314), share of urban population, and share of people older than 50 or 60,
respectively. Since canton-level economic indicators are only available since 1998, we use the
number of motor vehicles per person as a proxy for the level of the economy (Ashenfelter
and Kelley 1975; Knack 1995; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1993; Duch and Stevenson 2010).
Table A2 in the Appendix provides a complete list of variables and data sources.
As a first step, we simply compare average turnout rates in federal referendums in Vaud
with turnout rates in cantons that did not practice compulsory voting. Table A3 shows
these turnout rates along with the difference between Vaud and other cantons that did not
practice compulsory voting. Prior to the introduction of compulsory voting (1900-1924),
average turnout rates in Vaud (46%) were comparable to those in other cantons (47%). In
8The appendix provides the legal text of the compulsory voting law and a copy of an original document
that reports the federal revenues from the fine in one election (see Table A4 and Figure A9 in the Appendix).
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the treatment period, however, turnout in federal referendums is on average around 84% in
Vaud, which is about 30 percentage points higher than in other cantons (54%). In the post-
treatment period, federal referendum turnout decreases to 35%, which is about 8 percentage
points below the average participation rate in other cantons. A major problem with this
comparison of turnout rates is, of course, that cantons differ on many characteristics that
affect political participation and therefore, average turnout rates in cantons that did not
practice compulsory voting may not provide us with a convincing counterfactual, i.e, turnout
levels in Vaud that we would have expected in the absence of compulsory voting. To deal
with this problem, we now turn to the synthetic control method.
We define our quantity of interest as the difference between turnout in Vaud under
treatment conditions and turnout in Vaud under control conditions. Since we cannot observe
turnout in Vaud under control conditions in the treatment period, we employ a synthetic
control design as developed in Abadie and Gardezabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller (2010) to impute this missing counterfactual. Specifically, we impute the missing
counterfactual for the treated canton using a weighted average of control cantons in our donor
pool. The weights are exclusively based on pre-intervention data (including turnout and
covariates as predictors) to avoid post-treatment bias. In addition, this weighting procedure
avoids extrapolation. This would be the case if a unit in the donor pool would receive a
negative weight or a weight larger than unity, two common issues with regression-based
approaches.
We exclude those cantons from the donor pool that also practiced some—typically not
enforced—version of compulsory voting. These are Aargau, Appenzell Inner Rhodes, Ap-
penzell Outer Rhodes, Glarus, Graubuenden, Schaffhausen, St.Gallen, Ticino, Thurgau, and
Zurich (see also Table A5 in the appendix). This leaves us with a donor pool of 14 cantons.
Figure A1 in the Appendix shows a map with the cantons included in the donor pool. Vaud
introduced compulsory voting in 1924 and suspended it from late 1940 to 1945 due to World
War II. Compulsory voting was reactivated in late 1945 and eventually abolished in 1948.
Therefore, we define the 1900 to 1924 period as our pre-treatment period, 1925 to 1940 is
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our first treatment period, 1946 to 1948 the second treatment period, and 1949 to 1970 the
post-treatment period.9
To probe the plausibility of our identification assumption, we conduct a falsification test
and estimate a placebo treatment effect for the 1900 to 1924 pre-treatment period. This
is an important step to check whether the treated and the synthetic Vaud followed the
same turnout trajectory prior to the introduction of compulsory voting. In addition, we
perform a series of placebo tests proposed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)
which further increase the credibility of our findings. In the robustness section we also
re-estimate our main results using panel data models with fixed effects. While our findings
remain unchanged, additional analysis suggest that the panel data regressions assign negative
weights to some of our control units. This means that the results from the panel regression
approach will rely on stronger assumptions about the functional form that maps from the set
of regressors to outcomes. The estimates based on the synthetic control method avoid this
type of extrapolation and therefore offer less model-dependent inference (Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller 2015).
Empirical Results
Identifying Assumption
We first turn to the credibility of our results by exploring the plausibility of our identifiying
assumption. The left panel in Figure 1 shows average turnout rates in federal referendums
in Vaud. When considering the pre-treatment period (1900-1924), we find that turnout in
synthetic Vaud tracks the observed turnout dynamics in treated Vaud very closely. The
right panel of Figure 1 plots the differences between turnout in Vaud and its synthetic
control. The differences are relatively small and fluctuate around zero. Since turnout in our
synthetic control canton mimics the turnout trajectory in Vaud very closely, we conclude
9The last referendums under voluntary voting took place on February 12th, 1924. The subsequent
referendum on May 24th, 1925, took place under compulsory voting.
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that the synthetic control unit performs well in approximating participation rates in federal
referendums in the pre-treatment period. This increases our confidence in the identifying
assumption, which says that in the absence of compulsory voting, we would have observed
turnout levels that equal those in synthetic Vaud.
We also explore the similarity of Vaud and synthetic Vaud in terms of their socio-
demographic and economic characteristics. The better the pre-intervention characteristics
of synthetic Vaud resemble those in treated Vaud, the more plausible the assumption that
turnout in synthetic Vaud provides us with a convincing counterfactual for estimating the
causal effect of compulsory voting (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015). Table A6 in
the Appendix reports the means of those variables. These descriptives show that the two
units are closely comparable in terms of their pre-treatment turnout rates (see also Figure 1)
and with respect to their age structure, public revenue, population size, structure of the
economy, and economic development. 10
Contemporaneous Effects
The left panel in Figure 1 plots turnout in federal referendums in the observed Vaud and
its synthetic counterpart. Turnout in the pre-treatment period is about 40% on average. In
late 1924, voting becomes compulsory and non-voters are fined. This is when the turnout
trajectories between observed and synthetic Vaud begin to diverge. Turnout averages in
Vaud increase rapidly to levels between 80 and 90%. In synthetic Vaud, however, turnout
fluctuates at around 50%, but remains well below turnout in treated Vaud. We also find
that the variance in participation rates decreases, i.e., compulsory voting stabilizes turnout
at significantly higher levels.11 These pronounced differential dynamics persist until 1940,
10For turnout in federal referendums, the weights forming synthetic Vaud are as follows: Bern (0.29),
Obwalden (0.27), Geneva (0.25), Luzern (0.12), Schwyz (0.08). For annual turnout averages, the weights
forming synthetic Vaud are as follows: Bern (0.27), Geneva (0.24), Luzern (0.21), Obwalden (0.12), Schwyz
(0.10), Valais (0.06).
11During the treatment period the variance in turnout in Vaud is 9 percentage points. In contrast, the
turnout variation in the control units is 21 percentage points.
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when Vaud temporarily suspended compulsory voting. Turnout in Vaud reacts quickly to
this policy change and drops to about 50%. This turnout level still appears higher than in
synthetic Vaud, maybe because not all citizens were equally well informed about the fact
that compulsory voting had been temporarily suspended. In the brief period between 1946
and 1948, Vaud re-activated compulsory voting, which again induces a sharp increase in
turnout that clearly exceeds turnout in the synthetic control unit. This quick response to
the repeated introduction of compulsory voting and its removal adds to our confidence that
the turnout effects are causally attributable to the policy intervention. The right panel in
Figure 1 shows the differences in turnout averages between the observed and the synthetic
Vaud. The treatment effects are large, ranging from about 20 to 60 percentage points with
an average of 30 percentage points. We also note that the effect decreases slightly over time,
which may reflect that the real value of the fine, which remained constant in nominal terms,
decreased, although many other potential explanations such as voter fatigue remain possible.
Arguably, the large effect of compulsory voting on turnout relies on the existence of mo-
bilization potential. Specifically, we expect that less salient issues that would normally be
associated with lower turnout levels form the basis for the mobilization effects of compulsory
voting. We explore whether this is the case by plotting the estimated treatment effects by
a referendum proposal’s number of signatures as a measure of its salience.12 This requires
restricting our sample to optional referendums and popular initiatives. Figure A2 in the
Appendix plots the estimated mobilization effect of compulsory voting against the number
of signatures on ballot propositions. To explore the sensitivity of the relationship to outliers
(propositions that received an exceptionally high number of signatures), we estimate two
regression lines: one for the subset of propositions with up to 200’000 signatures (solid line)
and one estimated on the basis of the full sample (dashed line). Irrespective of which sample
we focus on, our results suggest that the salience of a proposal appears to explain some of
12Note that popular initiatives were launched only if 50,000 valid signatures were collected, optional
referendums required a minimum of 30,000 signatures. Overall, the number of signatures is a good predictor
of turnout with a correlation of 0.31 in the period of 1900–1970.
12
the differences in the treatment effect. If the salience of a proposal is low (around 50’000
signatures), the average treatment effect is about 36 percentage points. However, in case the
proposal is moderately salient the treatment effect decreases to 30 percentage points. The
relationship is even stronger when we restricting our sample to ballot propositions with up
to 200’000 signatures (solid regression line). This result is consistent with the idea that the
salience of an issue moderates the positive effect of compulsory voting on political particip-
ation. Yet, this does not imply that the turnout effect of compulsory voting was confined
to politically irrelevant referendums. Examples of important referendums with relatively
low turnout include a proposal to change the Swiss political system into an autocratic state
(Fronteninitiative in 1935) or a proposal to limit immigration (Massnahmen gegen die Ue-
berfremdung in 1928). Both referendums constitute crucial direct-legislative decisions on
politically and economically important issues.
Our main estimate of 30 percentage points exceeds those reported in previous cross-
country studies, which range from 7 to 15 percentage points (Panagopoulos 2011b; Franklin
2004; Blais and Young 1996; Jackman 1987), by a factor of 2 to 4.13 Compared with these
previous findings, our results suggest that compulsory voting mobilized citizens massively.
This should have increased the probability of habit formation, thereby giving rise to long-
term increases in turnout in federal referendums, and should also have induced political
participation spillovers on forms of civic engagement other than turnout in federal referen-
dums. In what follows we first examine the long-term effects and subsequently turn to an
analysis of participation spillovers.
Long-term Effects
The habit-formation argument assumes that individuals’ preferences, in particular those of
younger persons, are socially programmable (Gintis 2003; Cooter 2000; Weber 1968; Ross
13We also attempted to explore whether this effect varies as a function of community size (Panagopoulos
2011a; Funk 2010), but the community-level data we would need for such an analysis is unavailable for the
historical time period we study.
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1896). Against this theoretical background, we can compute a rough benchmark estimate of
the expected long-term effect of compulsory voting on turnout in federal referendums. We
focus on the number of first-time voters who were socialized as citizens under compulsory
voting from 1925 to 1940. Based on birth rates data from the Swiss census, we can say that
about 3,000 male individuals became potential first-time voters in Vaud each year. Thus,
by the end of 1940, when Vaud temporarily suspended compulsory voting, about 45,000
individuals had become first-time voters under compulsory voting with monetary sanctions.
The number of individuals eligible to vote equaled about 101,000. Thus, if only half of the
younger age cohorts that had been socialized under compulsory voting developed a habit to
turn out, we would expect a persistent effect on turnout of about 22 percentage points in
the post-treatment period.
If we inspect the turnout differences in the post-treatment period (1949-1970) shown
in the right panel of Figure 1, however, we observe no such persistent, positive turnout
effect. Instead, when Vaud abolished compulsory voting, the treatment effect drops to zero
with only erratic deviations in subsequent referendums. Synthetic Vaud and observed Vaud
again experience roughly comparable turnout rates. This pattern suggests that, although
compulsory voting substantially mobilized citizens to participate in federal referendums in
the period in which Vaud severely sanctioned non-voting, this thorough law enforcement
did not lead individuals to develop a voting habit. We refrain from studying the post-1970
period because Switzerland introduced female suffrage in 1971. Such a structural shock is
likely to jeopardize the credibility of subsequent comparisons.
To more directly explore the existence of habit formation among young and first-time
voters (Franklin 2004), Figure A7 in the Appendix reports the average long-term effects of
compulsory voting on turnout, again estimated within a synthetic control design, broken
down by various measures of districts’ age composition. Since habit formation should be
most pronounced among young voters, we would expect that Vaud’s compulsory voting law
should have increased turnout most strongly in districts with a high share of first-time voters.
However, the results in Figure A7 suggest that the long-term turnout effects are indistin-
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guishable from zero for all districts irrespective of their share of first-time voters. These
results remain unchanged when using alternative measures of districts’ age compositions.
Robustness: Placebo Tests, Extrapolation, Temporal Aggregation
We perform two placebo tests to explore the robustness of our main results. The first
is a placebo test in space. The second is a placebo test in time (Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller 2010). Due to space constraints, we only report the results. The Appendix
describes the tests in more detail. Turning to the placebo test in space, the left panel in
Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the treatment effect during the 1925-1940 period in Vaud
and the 14 placebo effects, one for each canton in the donor pool. We find that the effect
of compulsory voting in Vaud exceeds all placebo effects. The p-value that corresponds to
Vaud’s treatment effect equals the smallest possible value given the sample size. This value
is 1
14
= .07. The right panel in Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the results from our placebo
test in time (see the Appendix for details about the implementation of this test). We find
only negligibly small placebo effects. In fact, the differences between the 1900-1914 and the
1915-1924 period are, in absolute terms, of the same size. Specifically, we do not find an
effect in the 1914-1924 period which directly precedes the true treatment period in which
Vaud practiced compulsory voting. Thus, the placebo test in time also suggests that the
large effects we document have a causal interpretation.14
We also re-estimate the effect of compulsory voting on turnout in federal referendums
using panel data regressions in which we control for all available covariates, fixed effects for
each district and referendum day, as well as linear and quadratic time trends. We employ
two-way clustered standard errors that account for dependencies between observations at
the cantonal level and referendum day. Table 1 in the Appendix reports the results. When
14Vaud’s compulsory voting norm required only citizens below the age of 65 to participate in federal
referendums (see legal text in Table A4 in the Appendix). We therefore also examined whether the mobilizing
effect of Vaud’s compulsory voting norm decreases as a function of the share of elderly in the population.
Empirically, however, we do not find such a pattern.
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looking at the results from Model 4, which constitutes our preferred specification, we again
find that turnout in federal referendums significantly increases by about 30 percentage points
on average. Yet, this strong contemporaneous effect is not associated with a long-term
increase in political participation once compulsory voting has abolished: The coefficient on
the post-treatment indicator is close to zero (-0.01) and not statistically significant.
We explore the extent to which one would have to be skeptical of a regression-based
approach by analyzing whether regression estimates of the effect of compulsory voting rely
on extrapolation. Extrapolation in this context means that the counterfactual outcome
would be imputed by assigning negative weights to one or more units that did not practice
compulsory voting. If this was the case, the regression approach would go beyond the support
of the characteristics we actually observe for the control units which, in turn, would mean
that inferences will be more model-dependent (King and Zeng 2006). This analysis requires
us to derive the weights that the panel regression design implicitly assigns to the control
units (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015). Figure A8 in the Appendix reports those
results. We find that the panel model assigns negative weights to seven out of the 14 cantons.
In contrast to the panel regression results, our synthetic control estimates do not rely on this
implicit extrapolation. We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to the use of pre-
treatment outcome values in our estimation of the synthetic control weights. We re-construct
synthetic Vaud based on weights that exclude pre-treatment turnout as a predictor variable
and find that the results remain unchanged (see Figure A5 in the Appendix).
Finally, we explore whether our findings are sensitive to the temporal aggregation of
the pre-intervention turnout measure which serves as the basis for computing the synthetic
control weights. Specifically, we probe whether our results change if we use referendum-day
turnout as opposed to annual turnout averages to compute the weights for our synthetic
control canton. Figure A6 in the Appendix shows the evolution of referendum-day turnout
(left panel) and annual turnout averages (right panel) in Vaud along with two different
versions of synthetic Vaud. For the left panel, we estimated the synthetic control weights
using referendum-day turnout data. The right panel employs results based on annual turnout
16
averages. The turnout trajectories are virtually identical which suggests that our results do
not depend on whether the weights are estimated on referendum-day turnout data or annual
turnout averages.
Participation Spillovers
Did compulsory voting for federal referendums have more far-reaching spillover effects on
other types of political collective action for which participation remained voluntary? To
provide a more comprehensive assessment of these potential spillover effects we explore three
types of civic engagement: Turnout in federal elections, turnout in cantonal referendums,
and the number of signatures on ballot propositions.
First, we explore potential contagion effects on turnout in federal elections for which
participation remained voluntary throughout the treatment period. Federal elections take
place every four years, which strongly reduces the number of observations: There were
two federal elections in Vaud in the pre-treatment period, six in the treatment period, and
five in the post-treatment period. Panel A in Table 2 reports average turnout levels in
both Vaud and the synthetic Vaud. Based on these quantities we compute a difference-in-
differences estimate for the effect of compulsory voting in political participation. We find
that compulsory voting for federal referendums also appears to significantly increase turnout
in federal elections by about 12 percentage points when accounting for the pre-treatment
differences between Vaud and its synthetic counterpart. Yet, when looking at the election
that was concurrent with a federal referendum, we find that this effect is much larger, about
24 percentage points (since this effect is estimated based on cantonal-level turnout data from
a single federal election, we do not report a standard error for this estimate). In contrast,
turnout significantly increases by 9 percentage points in elections that were not concurrent
with a federal referendum. This heterogeneity in the increase in election turnout suggests
that the spillover effect largely stems from the fact that some elections were concurrent with
federal referendums in which citizens had to participate to avoid the fine. Consequently,
casting a vote in an election that was concurrent with a federal referendum posed little to
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zero extra costs.
Our second test of potential spillover effects induced by compulsory voting examines
turnout in cantonal referendums. Again, participation in cantonal referendums remained vol-
untary throughout the treatment period. We note, that the empirical basis for cross-cantonal
comparisons remains somewhat limited for cantonal referendums, as these normally deal with
specific, cantonal issues and are not temporally synchronized across cantons. Turning to the
difference-in-differences results, Panel B in Table 2 suggests that turnout in cantonal refer-
endums in Vaud significantly increases by about 20 percentage points. To what extent does
this positive effect of compulsory voting for federal referendums reflect a habit-formation
mechanism in which citizens develop a preference for political participation as opposed to
simple cost-benefit calculations in which individuals adjust quickly to changes in the costs
of non-voting? To explore this question, Table 2 also reports average turnout in cantonal
referendums that were concurrent with federal referendums and those that were not. We
again find strong heterogeneity in compulsory voting’s mobilization effect: The difference-in-
difference estimates suggest that turnout in cantonal referendums that are concurrent with
federal referendums increases significantly by 53 percentage points on average. In contrast,
turnout in cantonal referendums that are non-concurrent increases only by 13 percentage
points. Again, this is consistent with the idea that turnout increased in concurrent cantonal
referendums at least partly because in these cases casting a vote caused little extra costs.
How far-reaching were the spillover effects of compulsory voting for federal referendums?
To address this question we collected data on the number of citizens that signed a petition.
This form of political collective action provides an interesting case to more comprehensively
examine the existence of participation spillovers that may originate from compulsory voting.
The lower part of Table 2 (Panel C) reports the number of signatures on petitions for
initiatives and referendums in Vaud in the pre-treatment and the treatment period as a
share of the total number of signatures on ballot propositions in Switzerland. We find
that the number of signed petitions in Vaud actually decreases during the period in which
participation in federal referendums was compulsory. Thus, compulsory voting for federal
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referendums did not systematically mobilize citizens to more actively participate in initiating
direct legislation by signing petitions. Consistent with Dinas’s (2012) results for elections,
voting does not increase participation in other types of political collective action.
Conclusion
Previous research has devoted great effort to exploring the effects of compulsory voting
on contemporaneous political behavior, but we have very little empirical knowledge about
whether sanctioning abstention can contribute to the formation of voting habits. Our study
addresses this question by evaluating the long-term and spillover effects of a compulsory
voting law in the Swiss canton of Vaud. Such an analysis appears all the more important
since a large body of theoretical work on the paradox of voting has resorted to a “civic
duty” term to explain why levels of civic engagement strongly exceed those predicted by
rationalist models of political participation (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Owen
and Grofman 1984; Feddersen 2004). However, such a consumption benefit explanation of
political collective action requires research that examines the conditions under which poli-
cymakers can cultivate a social norm of civic voluntarism. We contribute to this research
by exploring whether electoral institutions can induce citizens to internalize a political par-
ticipation norm and thereby generate a preference for civic engagement.
First, we find that compulsory voting increases turnout in federal referendums massively,
by about 30 percentage points on average. However, this effect vanishes quickly as soon
as voting is no longer compulsory. Second, the results suggest that compulsory voting can
give rise to positive spillover effects on other forms of political collective action for which
participation remains voluntary. While these spillover effects seem to exist, they are most
pronounced in elections that are concurrent with federal referendums for which non-voters
have to pay a fine. The spillover effects on turnout in non-concurrent elections are less
pronounced and become negative when we examine participation in democracy as measured
by the number of signatures on petitions for ballot propositions.
19
These results qualify theories of habit formation in the context of long-standing compuls-
ory voting laws since socialization under compulsory voting failed to induce the evolution
of voting habits. Instead, the findings appear more consistent with a simple model of polit-
ical participation in which individuals quickly adapt to exogenous changes in the costs of
non-voting even if they have been exposed to a specific regime for a long period. We can
identify several potential explanations for our finding. First, one may argue a posteriori that
forcing citizens to participate in political collective action will fail to cultivate civic voluntar-
ism because individuals simply do not view political engagement as something normatively
desirable. For example, if one abolished the annoying and unhygienic requirement for airline
passengers to remove their shoes before security inspections, few individuals would continue
to take off their shoes. Presumably, travelers will not have internalized this norm as they
do not believe this behavior to truly increase security. However, this explanation appears
difficult to square with the pervasive evidence on citizens’ positive perceptions of civic in-
volvement in political decision-making (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2003; Schaub 2012). For
example, recent data from a post-referendum survey in Switzerland (FORS 2012) shows that
88% of all non-voters and 92% of all voters view citizen involvement in policy-making as im-
portant.15 Although these figures are based on stated preferences, they at least suggest that
citizens perceive participation in political collective action as something positive in nature
and compulsory voting clearly seems to be an effective means to this end.
Another potential explanation for why our findings differ from previous studies (Gerber,
Green, and Shachar 2003; Meredith 2009; Fujiwara, Meng, and Vogl 2016) highlights indi-
viduals’ perceptions of the legislative process underlying an electoral reform. In Vaud, elites
imposed compulsory voting on citizens. If, instead, citizens actively decided to introduce
compulsory voting in a referendum, this could increase its public acceptance and serve as a
signal to the citizenry that many view voting as normatively desirable behavior. To answer
these and related questions would require the use of micro-level data on voters and non-
voters which is not available for the historical time period we study here. However, they
15In Vaud, 91% of all non-voters and 93% of all voters value civic engagement.
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present promising avenues for future research.
Finally, one may ask how our results compare with studies that explore an increase in
the costs of voting as opposed to an increase in the costs of non-voting. Lott and Kenny
(1999) report that in the United States it took up to 30 years until turnout levels recovered
from a pronounced decline in political participation due to the introduction of a poll tax.
This could indicate that participation in political collective action adjusts more quickly to a
decrease in the costs of non-voting than a decrease in the costs of voting. Future work may
explore such asymmetries as well as their broader impact on participation in other types of
political collective action.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Compulsory Voting and Turnout in Federal Referendums: Vaud and Synthetic
Vaud
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Note: The left panel shows turnout in treated and synthetic Vaud for federal referendums between
1900 and 1970. Periods in which Vaud practiced compulsory voting are shaded gray
(1925-1940 and 1945-49). The right panel shows the difference in turnout between treated
and synthetic Vaud.
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Table 1: The Effect of Compulsory Voting: Panel Regression Estimates
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Compulsory voting 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Post-treatment -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.66] [0.66] [0.66]
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80
District FEs 3 3 3 3
Referendum Day FEs 3 3 3 3
Covariates 7 3 3 3
Linear time trends 7 7 3 3
Quadratic time trends 7 7 7 3
Note: This table shows the coefficients from panel regressions with
two-way clustered standard errors (in parentheses) and p-values (in
brackets). Vaud practiced compulsory voting from 1925 to 1940
and 1945 to 1949. The variable Compulsory Voting equals one in
those two periods and is zero otherwise. Standard errors are two-way
clustered by canton and referendum days. Time trends are applied
at the cantonal level.
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Table 2: Participation Spillovers: Federal Elections, Cantonal Referendums, and Signed
Petitions
Vaud Synthetic DiD N
Vaud
(A) Turnout in Federal Elections
Pre-compulsory voting (1900-1924) 69.12 63.52 2
(2.22) (2.01)
Compulsory Voting (1925-1940, 1945-1949) 78.1 60.98 11.53 5
(3.36) (1.39) (4.71)
concurrent with federal referendums (1925) 87.07 57.39 24.09 1
non-concurrent with federal referendums 75.86 61.74 8.52 4
(3.23) (1.65) (4.71)
(B) Turnout in Cantonal Referendums
Pre-compulsory voting (1900-1924) 23.84 45.58 20
(2.57) (1.39)
Compulsory Voting (1925-1940, 1945-1949) 43.45 46.03 19.16 24
(4.84) (1.21) (5.78)
concurrent with federal referendums 84.82 54.18 52.39 4
(1.28) (2.75) (4.22)
non-concurrent with federal referendums 35.18 44.05 12.87 20
(3.51) (1.64) (4.86)
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(C) Signed Petitions
Pre-compulsory voting (1900-1924) 12.69 5.93 26
(2.29) (0.3)
Compulsory Voting (1925-1940, 1945-1949) 4.89 6.35 -8.22 18
(1.07) (0.49) (2.59)
Note: This table shows the means of turnout in federal elections (Panel A), cantonal referendums
(Panel B), and the average number of signatures on petitions for federal
referendums in Vaud as a share of the total number of signatures on petitions for ballot
propositions in Switzerland (Panel C) for Vaud and
Synthetic Vaud. Vaud practiced compulsory voting from 1925 to 1940 and 1945 to 1949.
The variable Compulsory Voting equals one in those two periods and is zero otherwise.
DiD is the difference-in-differences estimate. N is the number of observations. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Online Appendix for “Compulsory Voting, Habit Formation, and Political
Participation”
by
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Synthetic Control Method
This summary follows the exposition of the synthetic control method in Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller (2010). To impute the missing counterfactual for the treated canton, we
create a weighted average of control cantons j = 2, . . . , J + 1 in our donor pool. To that
end, let W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)
′ denote a set of weights with wj ≥ 0 for j = 2, . . . , J + 1 and
w2 + · · ·+wJ+1 = 1. Each set of weights characterizes one possible synthetic control canton.
The weights are exclusively based on pre-intervention data to avoid post-treatment bias.
For the preintervention period t ≤ T0, let Yi1, . . . , YiT0 denote observed turnout rates and
Zi1, . . . , ZiT0 the corresponding set of predictors. If W = W
∗ such that
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jZj = Z1,
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYj1 = Y11, · · · ,
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYjT0 = Y1T0 .
then, for the treatment periods t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T1}, we obtain an unbiased estimator of the
effect on turnout, α1t, given by:
α̂1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYjt.
Let X1 = (Z1, Y11, . . . , Y1T0)
′ denote a (k × 1) vector of preintervention characteristics
containing relevant predictors and our outcome variable (turnout) and let X0 be a (k × J)
matrix which contains the same variables for our control cantons. We choose W ∗ such that
it minimizes ‖X1 − X0W‖ in the pre-treatment period subject to the convexity constraint
1
on the weights.16
We exclude those cantons from the donor pool that also practiced some—typically not
enforced—version of compulsory voting. These are Aargau, Appenzell Inner Rhodes, Ap-
penzell Outer Rhodes, Glarus, Graubuenden, Schaffhausen, St Gallen, Ticino, Thurgau, and
Zurich (see also Table A5 in the appendix). This leaves us with a donor pool of 14 cantons.
Figure A1 in the Appendix shows which cantons are included in the donor pool. Vaud in-
troduced compulsory voting in 1924 and suspended it from late 1940 to 1945 due to World
War II. Compulsory voting was reactivated in late 1945 and eventually abolished in 1948.
Therefore, we define the 1900 to 1924 period as our pre-treatment period, 1925 to 1940 is
our first treatment period, 1946 to 1948 the second treatment period, and 1949 to 1970 the
post-treatment period.17
Description of Placebo Tests in Space and Time
The placebo test in space rests on the idea that we can (falsely) pretend that a control unit
has been treated even though it has not been. Under this assumption we can we generate a
synthetic control canton for each unit in the donor pool using the synthetic control method.
We then compute placebo treatment effects for each donor canton for the period in which
Vaud practiced compulsory voting. This provides us with an estimate of the distribution
of the treatment effect under the null hypothesis that compulsory voting has no effect on
turnout (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). We then rank the (absolute) size of the
treatment effect for the treated canton Vaud relative to the computed placebo effects for all
cantons in the donor pool.
We also conduct a placebo test in time. This test relies on the idea that we can shift the
16We consider ‖X1 − X0W‖V =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ), where V is the (k × k) symmetric and
positive semi-definite matrix that minimizes the mean squared prediction error in the pre-treatment period
(Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010).
17The last referendums under voluntary voting took place on February 12th, 1924. The subsequent
referendum on May 24th, 1925, took place under compulsory voting.
2
true treatment period and (falsely) assume compulsory to have been practiced in a period in
which it has not been. We implement this test by redefining the pre-treatment period and use
only a small subset of the pre-treatment observations to compute weights for the donor pool.
We then use these weights to compute turnout in the synthetic Vaud and estimate placebo
effects for the remaining pre-treatment period. More specifically, we use the 1900-1914
period to compute the weights and compare the difference between the turnout trajectories
of Vaud and its synthetic counterfactual in the 1915-1924 period. Large placebo effects would
question the findings from our main analysis. A very small pre-treatment difference between
the treated and the synthesized control canton, however, would lend further credibility to a
causal interpretation of our results.
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Table A2: Variables Definition
• Turnout : Percentage of voters as share of total number of citizens eligible to vote.
Period of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: Bolliger, Linder, and Rielle (2010)
• Population over 40 : Number of individuals over 50 as share of total population. Period
of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: SFS (2010)
• Population over 50 : Number of individuals over 50 as share of total population. Period
of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: SFS (2010)
• Population over 60 : Number of individuals over 60 as share of total population. Period
of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: SFS (2010)
• Population: Number of residents in a canton in logs. Period of measurement: 1900-
1924. Source: Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
• Urban Population: Share of individuals living in a city. Period of measurement: 1900-
1924. Source: Hofferbert (1976)
• Public Revenues : Public revenues per capita. Period of measurement: 1900-1924.
Source: Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
• Public Spending : Public spending per capita.
Period of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
• Primary Sector : Share of individuals working in primary sector in terms of total popu-
lation. Period of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
• Secondary Sector : Share of individuals working in secondary sector in terms of total
population.
Period of measurement: 1900-1924. Source: Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
• Motor Vehicles : Number of motor vehicles per individual. Period of measurement:
1900-1924. Source: Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
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Table A3: Political Participation in Federal Referendums in Vaud, 1900-1970
Period Vaud Other Cantons Difference (points)
Pre-Treatment (1900-1924) 46 47 -1
Treatment (1925-1940, 1946-1949) 84 54 30
Post-Treatment (1950-1970) 35 43 -8
Note: Average turnout rates in federal referendums in percent. Other cantons only include cantons
that did not practice compulsory voting.
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Table A4: Compulsory Voting Norm in the Swiss Canton of Vaud
Original Text
Vote obligatoire
Art. 49. En matie`re constitutionnelle ou le´gislative fe´de´rale, l’exercice du droit de vote est
obligatoire pour tout citoyen aˆge´ de moins de 65 ans re´volus, inscrit au roˆle des e´lecteurs. Le
citoyen qui n’a pas pris part au scrutin doit pre´senter, par e´crit, une excuse a` la municipalite´
au plus tard le deuxie`me jour apre`s la cloˆture des ope´rations. La municipalite´ transmet au
pre´fet, dans les dix jours, la liste des de´faillants et les excuses qui lui sont parvenues. Le
pre´fet statue sans recours sur ces excuses. Il tablit la liste de´finitive des citoyens soumis
a` la contribution pre´vue a` l’art. 113 et l’adresse au receveur pour perception. Un arreˆte´
du Conseil d’Etat fixe les de´tails d’exe´cution. Pour chaque votation fe´de´rale, cet article est
inse´re´ dans l’arreˆte´ cantonal.
Vote obligatoire. Contribution.
Art. 113. Tout citoyen, aˆge´ de moins de 65 ans, qui n’a pas pris part a` une votation fe´de´rale,
sans excuse valable, est tenu de verser une contribution de deux francs.Ne sont conside´re´s
comme excuses valables que les cas de force majeure tels que l’absence ne´cessaire, le grand
e´loignement et la maladie.
English Translation
Compulsory voting
Art. 49. Concerning the federal constitution or legislation, the exercise of the suffrage is
compulsory for any citizen under 65 years of age registered as a voter. The citizen who did
not take part in the ballot has to excuse himself in writing to the municipality no later than
the second day after the closing of the polls. The municipality sends to the prefect the list
of defaulters and the excuses they submitted. The prefect decides with no recourse on these
excuses. He compiles the definitive list of citizens subject to the fee according to art. 133
and addresses it to the receiver for the collection. A decree of the cantonal council records
7
the details of the execution. For every federal vote, this article is inserted in the cantonal
decree.
Compulsory voting. Fee.
Art. 113. Any citizen under 65 years of age who did not participate in a federal vote without
any valid excuse is required to pay a fee of two francs. Only cases of forced absence due to
Force majeure, a long distance or disease, are considered as valid excuses.
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Table A5: Overview of Compulsory Voting in Switzerland
Canton Compulsory Voting Fine
Not sanctioned Sanctioned
Aargau 1885-today 1905-1971 2 SFR
Appenzell Inner Rhodes 1872-today 1891-1924 0.50 to 5SFR
Appenzell Outer Rhodes 1908- 1834-1959
Basel-Landschaft - 1863-1882
Basel-Stadt - ?-1833 10 Batzen
Bern 1851-1980 1851-1869 1 SFR
Fribourg - -
Geneva - -
Glarus 1887-today 1887-1961 1 SFR
Graubuenden Unclear Unclear
Lucerne 1899-1971 -
Neuchatel 1891-1916 -
Nidwalden 1913-today -
Obwalden 1895-today -
Schaffhausen - 1904-today 1 SFR, since 1973 3 SFR
Schwyz 1848-1876
Solothurn 1856-1899
St Gallen 1981-2003? 1872-1981 2 SFR, since 1976 5 SFR
Thurgau 1869-1904 1904-1954 0.50 to 1 SFR
Ticino 1920-today? up to 3 SFR, depending on municipality
Uri 1875-today -
Valais - -
Vaud - 1925-1948 2 SFR
Zug 1894- -
Zurich 1955-1985 1869-1955 0.30 to 1 SFR, later 1 to 3 SFR (GV up to 50SFR)
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Table A6: Covariate Balance
Treated Synthetic Donor Pool
Population over 40 30.79 30.70 29.12
Population over 50 18.81 18.75 17.65
Population over 60 9.62 9.65 8.99
Public Revenues 85.22 81.88 68.94
Public Spending 89.42 92.96 75.98
Log Population 12.65 11.70 11.30
Urban Population 27.42 26.68 21.43
Working Population 46.91 47.05 46.27
Primary Sector 13.52 13.58 13.47
Secondary Sector 16.55 17.90 19.18
Motor Vehicles 2.67 2.65 1.84
Turnout 1900–1912 39.90 42.74 47.18
Turnout 1913–1924 50.71 49.62 46.06
Note: The table shows the means of the variables in the treated units, the synthetic control units,
and the (unweighted) donor pool using the (non-annual) federal referendum data.
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Figure A1: Cantons of Switzerland
Note: The map shows the boundaries of the Swiss cantons in early 1900. The canton of Vaud is
shaded black, cantons that are included in the donor pool are shaded dark gray. Cantons which
were excluded from the donor pool are shaded light gray. In 1900, Switzerland consisted of the
following cantons: Aargau (AG), Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI), Appenzell OuterRhodes (AR),
Basel-Landschaft (BL), Basel-Stadt (BS), Bern (BE), Fribourg (FR), Geneva (GE), Glarus (GL),
Graubuenden (GR), Luzern (LU), Neuchatel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schaff-
hausen (SH), Schwyz (SZ), Solothurn (SO), St Gallen (SG), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri (UR),
Valais (VS), Vaud (VD), Zug (ZG), and Zurich (ZH).
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Figure A2: The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Turnout by Number of Solicited Signatures
on Ballot Propositions: Popular Initiatives and Optional Referendums
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Note: This figure plots the estimated treatment effect against a ballot proposition’s solicited number
of signatures with two linear regression lines superimposed together with a 95%-confidence interval.
The solid regression line is estimated for ballot propositions with 0 to 200’000 signatures (the slope
is −0.54). The dashed regression line is estimated on the full sample (the slope is −0.34).
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Figure A3: Placebo Tests in Space and Time for Compulsory Voting and Average Turnout
in Federal Referendums
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Note: Top panel shows the treatment effect in treated and synthetic Vaud for federal referendums-
between 1900 and 1970. In the top panel, the treatment period is shaded gray. In the bottom
panel, the placebo treatment period is shaded dark gray and the true treatment period is shaded
light gray. The bottom panel shows the estimated placebo effects when assuming that the treat-
ment period was from 1915 to 1924. For this analysis, we use the 1900-1914 period to compute the
synthetic control weights.
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Figure A4: Turnout in Federal Referendums in Vaud and Cantons included in the Donor
Pool (1900-1970)
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Note: The figure shows the turnout in federal referendums in Vaud and cantons included in the
donor pool from from 1900 to 1970. VD=Vaud, BE=Bern, BL=Basel-Land, BS=Basel-Stadt,
FR=Fribourg, GE=Geneva, LU=Luzern, NE=Neuchatel, NW=Nidwalden, Obwalden=OW,
SZ=Schwyz, SO=Solothurn, UR=Uri, VS=Valais, ZG=Zug.
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Figure A5: The Short- and Long-term Effects of Compulsory Voting: Excluding Pre-
treatment Turnout as a Predictor
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Note: The figure shows referendum-day turnout in observed and synthetic Vaud. The variables
used to compute the synthetic control weights exclude pre-treatment turnout.
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Figure A6: The Short- and Long-term Effects of Compulsory Voting: Sensitivity to Altern-
ative Weights
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Note: The figure shows referendum-day turnout (top panel) and annual turnout averages (bottom
panel) with two different synthetic turnout trajectories based on referendum-day turnout (RDT)
and annual turnout averages (ATA).
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Figure A7: The Long-Term Effects of Compulsory Voting on Turnout by Districts’ Age
Composition
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Note: The figure shows the long-term effects (black dots) of compulsory voting on turnout in Vaud
estimated with the synthetic control method. Vertical lines indicate 95%-confidence intervals. The
left panel compares districts with a low vs. a high share of first-time voters under compulsory
voting. The middle panel compares districts with a low vs. a high share of voters that were below
the age of 30 during compulsory voting. The right panel compares districts with a low vs. a high
total number of years under compulsory voting relative to the population’s total years of voting
experience. For each comparison the median is used as a cutoff value to define the two groups.
N=19 districts. Information about districts’ age structures is based on 1950 census data.
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Figure A8: Comparison of Weights: Synthetic Control Unit and Panel Regression
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Note: This plot reports the weights assigned to the different cantons in the panel regression model
(triangles) and synthetic control design (black dots).
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Figure A9: Number of Voters and Fines Collected in Vaud in a 1926 Federal Referendums
by District
Note: The document provides information about the number of voters and nonvoters in the federal
referendums on 4th and 5th December 1926 in Vaud by district. The last column reports the
number of citizens that have paid the fine of two Swiss Francs. Source: Canton de Vaud (1926).
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